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CASE COMMENTS 
Constitutional Law --- Armed Forces- -
Living in Two.Worlds 
P, an army reservist, worked for a ~eatrical agency as agent for 
"rock and roll" bands. Because of this position P wore his hair 
''.longer than conventional length." Until July I, 1968, the Army 
permitted reservists to have long hair if it contributed to their 
civilian livelihood. On this date the Army issued a directive which 
ended that right. Faced with the threat of immediate induction, p 
instituted this action to permanently enjoin his superior officers 
from enforcing certain statutes and the July 1, 1968 directive. He 
alleged that enforcement of these statutes and the directive, result-
ing in his activation, would violate his constitutional right to 
practice his chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental 
interference and would constitute a denial of liberty without d"ue 
process of law. Held, injunction denied. The military did not go 
"far beyond any rational exercise of discretion:''' Standards of ap-
pearance for reservists are within the discretion of the military, and 
enforcement of these standards through procedures provided by law 
did not violate the rights of P. Absent extraordinary circumstances, 
the cow-ts will not review military administrative proceedings. 
R.aderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1969}. 
In disposing of the Constitutional questions raised by this 
case, the court first established that certain constitutional rights 
are curtailed or suspended while an individual is in the military.' In 
part, this is because the armed services "serve an essential function 
in safeguarding the country."" To fully discharge this duty the court 
found that the armed services require a degree of discipline that 
necessarily impairs certain rights. They also found that individual 
rights were not unconstitutionally impaired thereby because it is 
the Constitution that authorizes the creation of an Army! 
The courts allow the milita.-ry a wide breadth of discretion in 
the regulation of its personnel and are extremely reluctant to review 
the exercise of that discretion. As a test for judicial intervention 
this court would require "action by the military which goes far 
beyond any rational exercise of discretion."" Raderman was not 
'- Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102, ll06 (2d .Cir. 1969). 
'Id. at 1104. 
"Id. at 1104. 
• Id. at 1104. 
•Id.at ll06. 
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contesting improper application of admittedly valid regulations; he 
was contesting the validity of the regulation. To grant the relief 
sought, this court would have had to determine what 'is the proper 
length of a reservist's hair. Such a determination was found to be 
dearly within the discretion of the military, and therefore not 
reviewable. 
[A] federal court may properly examine the decision to 
call a reservist for active duty in order to determine if the 
reservist's procedural rights under the applicable statutes 
and military procedure and regulations were violated in a 
manner which caused substantial prejudice to the reser-
vist.• 
This statement is by the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit less than one year before Raderman, in a remarkably similar 
factual situation involving a long-haired "rock and roll" musician. 
The cases are distinguished on two points: (I) In the earlier case, 
Smith v. Resor, the reservist had already been ordered to active 
duty, and (2) i~ Smith the Army regulation permitting reservists 
to wear long hair if it contributed to their civilian livelihood was 
still in effect: The second difference, of course, is controlling. To 
grant relief in Smith the court merely had to require the Army to 
follow its own regulation. Since the Army's discretionary standards 
.for reservists were not questioned, the court felt that to grant relief 
• Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1969'). 
'The Army's Weekly Bulletin, dated Oct. 20, 1967, provided: 
4. WEARING OF BEARDS, LONG HAIR OR MOUSTACHES RY 
RESERVISTS. 
(a) References: 
(1) Para. 31, AR 600-20 
(2) Para. 34c, AR 140-1 
(h) Cited references provide the following: 
(1) Unit commanders have the authority to order individuals to 
remove, cut short, or trim, the items in question so that individ-
uals will present a neat and soldierly appearance. 
(2) Unit commanders have the authority to deny an individual 
credit for attendance at a drill if the individual does not pre-
sent a neat and soldierly appearance. 
(c) Individuals have the right to retain long han:, a beard or 
moustache if these items do, in fact, contribute to the individual's 
civilian livelihood. However, this must be proved by the individual 
concerned, and made a part of his record. If it is established that the 
individual's livelihood warrants long hair, a beard, OT moustache, the 
unit commander has the right to insist that they be maintained in a 
neat manner. 
(d) Discretion and moderation in issuing orders to remove beards 
should be exercised by the unit commanders, and each case wi11 be 
considered and evaluated individually as it is presented. 
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would not involve undue interference with the military. Also, in 
Smith the Army's in-service reviewing procedure was effectively 
closed off because the officer who made the decision to activate 
Smith removed from his personnel file the "proof" that his hair 
contributed to his civilian livelihood." 
From these two decisions one might conclude that when it is 
within the discretion of the military to establish standards for 
reservists, tl1ose standards are not judicially reviewable unless they 
go "far beyond any rational exercise of discretion."" But in applica-
tion, if regulations embodying these standards are violated to the 
substantial prejudice of a reservist, then the courts may grant relief. A 
reservist desiring to test an administrative determation by the mili-
tary resulting in his activation usually does so under a habeas corpus 
writ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 (1964). This statute makes the 
habeas writ available when the plaintiff is "in custody" without at-
tempting to set the boundaries of "custody". Decisions make clear 
that status as a member of the armed forces imposes a sufficient 
restraint on one's liberty to make the habeas writ available to him. 
However in United States ex rel Schonbrun v. Commanding Of-
ficer,'" another Second Circuit case, the court stated: 
Generally habeas corpus is available only to a petititioner 
who is entitled to release from unlawful restraint, and is not 
a nieans of testing the conditions of admittedly lawful 
custody .... On the other hand, habeas corpus will lie to 
test the legality of a change from probation or parole to 
imprisonment .... Arguably a transfer from reserve status 
to active duty is attracted by the analogy of this latter line 
of cases rather than the former, although a change in duty 
assignments of a soldier or sailor in active service would not 
be. Yet to hold that habeas lies in such a case would require 
a rather close distinction of the decisions that it is not avail-
able to a selective service registrant before induction.,,. 
• It is interesting to speculate about the Anny's reasons for is.suing the 
July 1, 1968 directive ending for reservists the prilvilege of wearing long hair. 
On July 1, 1968 the Army was under a Court order forbidding the induction 
of Smith pending final determination of his appeal. When Smith v. Resor was 
handed down in early 1969, in effect it directed the Anny to follow its own 
regulations. By this time the regulation the Army had violated to the prejudice 
of the reservist was no longer in effect. The Army could not activate Smith for 
having long hair at the time suit was brought, but it could require Smith to 
cut his hair, or faoe induction under the current regulations. 
• Rader:man v. Kaine, 411 F.2d ll02, 1106 (2d Cir. 1969). 
m 403 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1968). 
"United States ex rel Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371. 374 
(2d Cir. 1968) . 
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Whether or not habeas corpus is available to contest the call-
up of a reservist, a federal district court is free to treat the proceeding 
as one for mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. (1964). This statute 
vests the district courts with "original jurisdiction of any action in 
the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the 
United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the 
plaintiff."" Debate at the time of passage made dear that Congress 
did not intend the courts to use this statute to justify interference 
with the exercise of discretion." With respect to the military, courts 
have been very respectful of this intent, declining to intervene 
unless official action goes "far beyond any rational exercise of dis-
cretion."" For example, in Schonbru.n when plaintiff's unit was 
activated he sought relief under an Army regulation that exempted 
one whose activation would result in extreme personal and com-
munity hardship. His activation would have had an adverse effect 
on his wife's mental disorder, and he was a difficult-to-replace 
teacher in a special school for disadvantaged youth. The Army de-
cided he was not to be exempt from activation, and the court, 
though it sympathized with his plight, held that this was a rational 
exercise of discretion that would not justify judicial intervention. 
Regulations set forth by the service may, of course, be modified 
by the service. (Witness the regulation terminating the right of an 
Army reservist to retain long hair.) The effect of the "enlistment con-
tract" -the agreement between the reservist and the service in which 
he enlisted - on such modification pawer is unclear. The power of 
Congress to alter this "contract" is also undefined. One commonly 
used "agreement" signed by the reservist provided that the reservist 
could not be ordered to active duty without his consent, except in 
time of war, or when the President declared a national emergency, 
or "when otherwise prescribed by law." If the reservist did JJ.Ot 
participate satisfactorily in his military training, this fact was report-
ed to his draft board, which reclassified him and made him eligible 
for induction. This resulted in unsatisfactorily participating reser-
visits havi~g no more change of going on active duty than their draft-
eligible peers, although if called they would serve the normal two 
years plus the six months active duty all reservists undergo. To 
dose this "loophole", C..ongress enacted legislation en powering the 
""28 u.s.c. § 1361 (1964). . 
"'See 2 U.S. COl)]i: CoNG. &: AD. NEWS, 87th Cong. 2d Sess.., pp. 2784, 2785 
(1962). 
•• United States ex rel Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371, !174 
(2d. Cir. 1968). 
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armed services to order to active duty members of their respective 
reserves who were not serving satisfactorily."" This legislation gave 
the reservist credit for the six months he had already served, but 
eliminated draft board reclassification (and possible reclassification 
hearings) , and induction by the draft board. 
It is arguable that being ordered to active duty under this 
statute would be contrary to the agreement signed by the reservist 
when he entered the service, and the validity of the legislation has 
been tested by a few reservists ordered to active duty for unsatis-
factory participation. An unreported case by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California held that applica-
tion of the statute would violate the "enlistment contract", and 
would therefore be a deprivation of property without due process 
of law."' In a nearly identical factual situation, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the 
new statute was provided for in the "enlistment contract" by the 
phrase, "when otherwise prescribed by law", and therefore the 
"contract" was not violated." This court felt that if the clause were 
construed in any other way it would "fetter'' the President and Secre-
tary of Defense in the administration of the reserves.'" In another 
similar situation, the United States District Coun for Colorado dealt 
with an "enlistment contract'' that did not provide for a reservist 
to be ordered to active duty "when otherwise prescribed by law"."' 
There was no way of interpreting this "contract" so that a reservist 
could be ordered to active duty except in time of war or national 
emergency declared by the President. This court referred to the 
above decisions. and held that Congress has the power to alter 
existing contracts under certain circumstances through the exercise 
of some paramount power of the sovereign." In this instance the 
paramount power was the Constitutionally provided War Powers-· 
the powers of Congress to declare war, raise armies, and to govern 
and regulate land and naval forces. 
"'50 u .s.c. 456 (c} (2) (d) (1964). . 
111 Gion v. McNamara, Civil No. 67-1563-EC (G.D. Calif. Jan. 9, 1968) . 
.. Winters v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. N.Y. 1968), affrl per 
curiam 390 F .2d 879 (2d Cir. 1968) . 
"'Id. at 296. 
'"Pfile v. Corcoran, 287 F. Supp. 554. (D. C.Olo. 1968) . 
""Id. at 559. 
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CONCLUSION 
It appears that a reservist does not have rights protected to the 
same degree by the Constitution as do his fellow citizens who are 
civilians. Likewise, his access to the courts for review of administra-
tive proceedings appears more constricted than his civilian counter-. 
part.. The terms of the very agreement he signed that made him a 
member of the reserves are subject to modification by Congress in 
the exercise of some paramount sovereign power. These impair-
ments of liberty are adequately justified by the courts; indeed 
there are few citizens who would question the need of the military 
for discipline at the expense of some individual liberties. 
Problems sometimes arise when the soldier is also a civilian, or 
perhaps, when he is neither soldier nor civilian, but in limbo bet-
ween the two worlds and forced to live in both. For exam-
ple, he is subject to the same rigid discipline as a full-time soldier, 
but only for a few days each month. The effects of this discipline.-
however, often persist beyond the end of his drill (a man with short 
hair on the weekend rarely has lo~g hair the following week, though 
he has the same freedom to wear lo~g hair then as any civilian).· 
Problems involving reservists multiplied with the Viet Nam 
War; after its end we shall see a corresponding reduction in litiga-
tion. These problems have helped define more clearly the rights 
and obligations of reservists. 
William Robert Wooton 
Constitutional Law - Judicial Review of 
Congressional Membership Exclusion 
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was duly elected from the 
Eighteenth Congressional District of New York to serve in the 
House of Representatives for the Ninetieth Congress. During the 
Eighty-ninth Congress, a special subcommittee of the ~ouse had 
reported that the Committee on Education and Labor,· of which 
Powell was chairman, had deceived the House authorities as to 
travel expenses and, additionally, that there was strong evidence 
that Powell had directed illegal salary payments to his wife. Con-
sequently, when the Ninetieth Congress organized in January, 1967; 
the oath was not administered to Powell. On February 23, 1967, a 
select committee of the Ninetieth Congress issued a report, finding 
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